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The Circulation Migration  




lthough there is much discussion of immigration’s impact on the U.S. 
domestic economy, there is also renewed interest in immigration’s effects 
on low-income, sending countries. However, in this latter discussion, 
there is an under-appreciation of two important features.
First, a significant proportion of the skill residing in low-income countries is 
produced in high-income countries. Four countries—United States, Great Brit-
ain, Australia, and Canada—provide over 525,000 student visas per year. In the 
U.S., over 250,000 student visas were issued in 2004, compared with 73,212 em-
ployment visas for permanent immigrants screened for skill. The United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) estimates that there 
are over 2.5 million foreign students in the world, and more than half are from 
low-income countries.
Second, many “permanent” skilled migrants—those entitled to stay for the 
rest of their lives in the receiving country—and those who migrate to acquire ad-
ditional schooling (and get good jobs) return to their home country.
Little is known about the international net flow of high-skill human capital 
and its effects on developing countries. The immigration literature has three defi-
ciencies in studying the determinants of who immigrates and who returns:
1.  Existing frameworks and data are inadequate to appropriately describe 
measures of gaps in rewards to skill across countries.
2.  Empirical analyses lump together immigrants selected via family reunifica-
tion rules and those selected on the basis of skill and jobs. Decision rules 1  Mark R. Rosenzweig
are likely to be quite different for the two groups. Indeed, permanent 
resident aliens in the U.S. are admitted mostly (over 90 percent) based on 
family criteria and subject to country ceilings. Standard economic models 
of self-selection may not be adequate to understand international flows of 
people, as they ignore networking and marriage markets.
3.  No representative databases have tracked either foreign students or im-
migrants over time to enable estimates of return rates.
I will consider three questions. First, how inefficient is the global allocation of 
workers and how large are the gains from increased international migration? How 
do you measure these gains? We will see that standard GDP comparisons are not 
sufficient. Second, how would reallocating high-skill workers from low- to high-
wage areas affect low-wage countries? Third, what is the relationship between the 
net international flow of skilled individuals and the development of low-income 
countries? Which countries benefit the most and least from skill migration? 
I use simple analytics combined with new data on immigrants, foreign stu-
dents, and out-migrants. Two main data sources are newly available:
•  New Immigrant Survey (NIS): 4 percent sample of all U.S. adult (18+) 
permanent resident aliens who received their visas between April and 
November 2003 (number surveyed = 8,575).
•  New Immigrant Survey–Pilot (NIS–P): smaller sample of all U.S. adult (18+) 
permanent resident aliens who received their visas in July and August of 
1996 (number surveyed = 1,032).
Other sources I will draw on are an immigration survey of Australia, Inter-
national Labor Organization (ILO) data on international wages, and databases on 
students in the U.S.
Two sets of mechanisms will be discussed for how international movements 
of the skilled affect sending countries:
•  Direct short- and long-run effects on wages in sending countries: distin-
guishing between changes in prices of skill, skill composition effects, and 
skill upgrading incentives.
•  Return migration: brain drain and brain gain issues and evidence. I will 
discuss the potentially large biases in recent World Bank estimates of the 
brain drain from low-income countries based on census data and look at 
determinants of foreign students’ inflows and the return rates of foreign 
students and skilled “permanent” immigrants.
First, we will consider the principal source of the global migration/labor mis-The Circulation Migration of the Skilled and Economic Development  19
allocation problem: differing cross-country rewards for skills.
What are wage differences for comparable workers across countries? One ex-
ample: A construction carpenter’s monthly wage is $42 in India, $125 in Mexico, 
$1,113 in Korea, and $2,299 in the U.S. (ILO 1995 data). The problem: Carpenters 
in India may have much lower schooling than carpenters in the U.S. or even Ko-
rea. This does not capture correctly the gains from the migration of a person of 
a given skill. Per capita GDP gaps are used in most analyses of the determinants 
of migration (Figure 1). But cross-country variation in GDP is due to differences 
in the proportion of the population in the labor force and in skill levels, not just 
rewards to skills. Per-worker GDP also is not adequate. Workers vary substantially 
in skill across countries. So we can’t know how the rewards to skills differ across 
countries from the databases that have been available.
Skill-Price Model and Identification of Cross-Country 
Skill Rewards
The simplest economic model, a one-skill model, illustrates the main direct effects 
of migration and is key to understanding the migration of skills across countries.
Figure 1

















NOTE: S = average years of schooling.
SOURCES: World Bank and Occupational Wages Around the World.10  Mark R. Rosenzweig
Worker i’s wage Wij in home country j is
(1)       Wij = ωjxi,
where  xi  =  the  skill  level  of  the  worker  (amount  of  skill  units)  and   
ωj = the amount each unit of skill is valued in the economy in which the worker 
is located, referred to here as the skill price.
Variation in wages across workers within a country is due to variation in skill 
levels. Variation in the average wages of workers across countries is due to inter-
country differences in (a) average skill levels xi and (b) skill prices ωj. Increasing 
incomes in a country thus entails increasing either (a) the price paid for skills or 
(b) skill levels.
Much attention has been given to raising skills in low-income countries (for 
example, greater access to education, improved school quality). But why skill 
prices—rewards to skills—differ across countries is really the key question of 
development economics, as difference in skill levels across countries is substan-
tially smaller than differences in skill rewards. Some of the suspects are natu-
ral endowments (geography), population density, the level of technology, the 
amount of capital, the amount of aggregate skill, or, on a deeper level, the quality 
of institutions. The question today is how international migration affects skill lev-
els, skill prices, and the determinants of skill prices.
The model has implications for the number and quality (skill composition) 
of immigrants from and to a country. The expected initial earnings that worker 
i in country j could earn in destination country u (ignoring for simplicity skill 
transferability) is given by:
(2)       pWiu = pωuxi,
where ωu = the destination-country skill price and p = the probability of obtain-
ing a permanent destination-country job.
The economic gain from migrating from j to u, Gij, for worker i is
(3)       Gij = xi[pωu – ωj(1 + πj)] – Cj,
where Cj = direct costs of migrating and πjWij = time costs of migrating.The Circulation Migration of the Skilled and Economic Development  11
Implications of the Skill-Price Migration Model
1.  Higher-skill persons always have greater gains from out-migration, com-
pared with lower-skill persons, for a given skill-price gap (selectivity). 
Thus, immigrants from high-skill-price countries will be more skilled on 
average than those from low-skill-price countries.
2.  The higher the domestic skill price, the lower is the gain from out-migra-
tion. Thus, there will be fewer immigrants from high-skill-price countries.
3.  Schooling acquired in the destination country may increase p and thus 
facilitate migration (and skill transferability, too).
4.  The lower the domestic skill price, the more an increase in skill increases 
the gain from migrating. Thus, increasing access to schooling in low-skill-
price countries can lead to higher rates of out-migration.
But how do we know what skill prices are around the world? And isn’t using 
differences in per capita GDP good enough to gauge the gains from migrating (as 
used in almost all studies of the determinants of migration)? In fact, variations in 
the skill price and GDP per capita can have opposite effects on migration (Figures 
2 and 3). For given direct migration costs, a rise in the skill price at home low-
ers the gain from migration. For a given skill price, higher per capita GDP may 
facilitate financing of the direct costs of migration.
And what about within-country inequality and its effects on emigration, as 
highlighted by George Borjas (1987)?
Estimating World Skill Prices
Estimating world skill prices requires comparable information on the earn-
ings of workers of the same skill across all countries of the world. Three recently 
available sources of data are
1.  New Immigrant Survey–Pilot (NIS–P), 1996 (Jasso et al. 2000): This data 
set provides the earnings of new U.S. immigrants in their last job in their 
home country.
       Advantages:
          •  Information is obtained from a common questionnaire.
          •  Information is obtained on workers’ schooling, age, and work   
          experience.
       Disadvantages:
          •  This is a selective sample: The model implies immigrants are   
          positively selected on unobservables.
          •  The sample size is small: 332 workers for 54 countries.12  Mark R. Rosenzweig
Figure 3
Alternative Measures of the Net One-Year Benefit from the U.S. Immigration of One 
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Figure 2
Alternative Measures of the Net One-Year Benefit from the U.S. Immigration of One 
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      2.  Occupational Wages Around the World (OWW) (Freeman and Oosten-
dorp 2000): This data source provides monthly earnings (estimated) for 
workers by occupation, industry, and year.
           Advantages:
               •  The sample size is large: 4,924 observations in a single year 
          (1995).
               •  It is meant to be nonselective.
           Disadvantages:
               •  The information is not necessarily comparable across countries.
               •  The number of countries represented is small in any one year: 67.
               •  There is no information on the education, work experience, or age   
          of workers (see carpenters example above).
      3.  New Immigrant Survey (NIS), 2003 baseline: Like the NIS pilot, this data 
set provides earnings of new U.S. immigrants in their last job in their home 
country.
           Advantages:
               •  Information is obtained from a common questionnaire.
               •  Information is obtained on workers’ schooling, age, work experi- 
          ence, and occupation.
               •  The sample size is over 2,200 workers for 130 countries.
           Disadvantages:
               •  It is a selective sample: The model implies immigrants are positively 
          selected on unobservables.
Table 1 shows some characteristics of these three data sets.
To estimate skill prices from microdata on wages “around the world,” assume 
the number of skill units of a worker is a function of schooling, occupation, and 
an unobservable skill endowment. For example:
(4)       xij = µijexp(bSij + Iijkγk),
where Sij = schooling, b = schooling “return,” µij = skill endowment (schooling 
missing in OWW), Iijk = a vector of occupation dummies for worker i in country 
j, and γk  = a vector of occupation coefficients.
Then the log of worker i’s wage in country j, from equation (1), is
(5)        Ln(Wij) = Lnωj + bSij + Iijkγk + Lnµij.
The intercept in equation (5), which may differ across countries, provides the 
log of the skill price for each country represented in the data.1  Mark R. Rosenzweig
What is the relationship between GDP and skill prices? Assume aggregate 
output Y in country j is produced according to Cobb–Douglas technology:
(6)       Yj = ALj
aKj
γ,
where Kj = country j’s stock of nonlabor resources (for example, land, capital, 
minerals) and Lj   =  country j’s aggregate stock of labor in skill, given by
(7)       Lj  = Nj [a(xij)],
where Nj = the total number of workers in j and a( ) is an inverse function yield-
ing the average skill units per worker in country j in terms of observables.
The skill price ωj is the marginal product of an efficiency unit of labor, given 
by
(8)       ωj = aYj/Nj [a(xij)].
Thus,
Table 1
Characteristics of Global Earnings Data Sets
  1996 NIS-P home-  OWW,  2003 NIS home-
Data set/variable    country workers  1995  country workers
Mean.annual.earnings.of.respondents.(U.S..$). 21,854a. 10,208b. 23,250a
. (77,608). (13,289). (54,596)
Mean.age.of.respondents. 34.6. –. 33.5
. (8.53). . (11.1)
Mean.years.of.schooling.of.respondents. 14.4. –. 13.9
. (4.5). . (3.7)
Number.of.industries. –. 49. –
Number.of.occupations. –. 161. 363
Number.of.countries. 54. 67. 130
Number.of.workers. 332. 4,924. 2,823
a PPP-adjusted, full-time earnings
b Exchange-rate adjusted, country-specific calibration with lexicographic imputation.
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(9)       Ln(ωj) = Lna + Ln(Yj/Nj) – Ln[a(xij)]
or, for the individual worker data on wages from the NIS–P, for example,
(10)      Ln(Wij) = Lna + Ln(Yj/Nj) – Ln[a(xij)] + bSij + Lnµij.
Equations (9) and (10) imply that aggregate output per worker is positively, 
and average skill levels are negatively, correlated with skill prices across coun-
tries. Estimating equation (9) or (10) should yield a coefficient of 1.0 on the log of 
output per worker and a coefficient with a minus sign for the log of the aggregate 
skill measure (Table 2).
In Jasso and Rosenzweig (2005), we used the NIS-P data and cross-country 
information on per-worker GDP and average education levels, based on equation 
(10), to estimate country-specific rewards to skill (ωj), controlling for the skills of 
the individual workers from the different countries represented in the NIS-P. Fig-
ure 4 displays the estimated earnings of high school versus college graduates for 
five countries based on the estimates using equation (5), with a common b (“re-
turn” to schooling) estimated to be 0.07. There are two features to note. One is 
the enormous difference in rewards to skills across the world. Second, compared 
with the differences in earnings across these countries, differences in earnings by 
schooling level are relatively minuscule.
How well does the variation across countries in (estimated) skill prices pre-
dict the number and skill composition of immigrants by country? In Jasso and 
Rosenzweig (2005), the NIS and the Longitudinal Survey of Australian Immigrants 
were used to compute:
•  The number of skilled immigrants (employment-based principal appli-
cants) by country of origin coming to the United States and Australia in 
the survey years of each data set.
•  The  average  schooling  level  of  these  skill/employment  immigrants  by 
country of origin for U.S. and Australian immigrants.
In addition, we can ask how well does the cross-country variation in esti-
mated skill prices predict the number of student visas issued per country. We use 
State Department information on F-1 student visas issued by country, averaged 
over 2003–04 (excludes Canada). To answer these questions we also look at the 
roles of the distance from the sending country to the receiving country, GDP per 
adult-equivalent, measures of school quality, the number of universities, and the 
number of ranked universities (Tables 3 and 4). Not surprisingly, for both Aus-
tralia and the U.S., the higher the skill price in the home country, the fewer the 
immigrants from that country. What is surprising is that, given the skill price, GDP 1  Mark R. Rosenzweig
per adult-equivalent is positive. So, for a given skill price, if a country has higher 
income per capita, there is actually more out-migration. Why? One hypothesis 
would be that there are financial costs to migration and having more income 
for given rewards enables more people to take advantage of those gaps. Costs 
of migration are important, as distance is significantly negatively related to the 
number of migrants.
Table 2
Estimates of the Determinants of the Country Log Skill Price
  U.S. immigrant home  OWW
Sample         wages (NIS-P)  wages
Variable/estimation procedure  GLS  GLS-SC    GLS
Country.characteristics:
...Log.GDP.per.worker. 1.41. 1.35. 1.10
. (5.01). (5.21). (10.4)
...Log.mean.schooling. –1.77. –1.97. –.33
. (3.18). (3.23). (1.47)
...Log.teacher–pupil.ratio,.primary.schools. –1.90. –2.17. –.509
....... (3.68). (3.80). (1.83)
...Log.teacher–pupil.ratio,.secondary.schools. 1.44. 1.36. .457
....... (2.51). (2.56). (1.60)
Immigrant.skill.characteristics:
...Schooling. .0683. .0745. –
.. (3.50). (3.79)
...Age. .0428. .0436. –
. (4.32). (4.50)
λ	 –. .800. –
. . (1.46)
Constant. –1.02. .713. –3.75
. (2.10). (2.04). (2.60)
Number.of.countries. 54. 54. 57
Number.of.immigrants. 332. 332. –
R2. .35. .36. .82
NOTES: GLS = generalized least squares; SC = selectivity-corrected. Absolute value of t statistics corrected for 
clustering at the country level in parentheses.
SOURCE: Rosenzweig (2006).The Circulation Migration of the Skilled and Economic Development  1
Regarding student visas, the number of people who come from another 
country to study in the U.S. varies inversely with the rewards to skill in that coun-
try. Moreover, the larger the number and the higher the quality of universities 
in the home country, the more students come to the U.S. to study (Table 5). In 
Rosenzweig (2006), these results are shown to be supportive of the hypothesis 
that foreign students are attracted to the United States because of the rewards to 
obtaining jobs here and not primarily because of inadequate supplies of school-
ing opportunities at home.
What About Inequality and Immigration?
Using the “Roy model,” Borjas has popularized the idea that inequality, and 
thus differences in the returns to schooling across countries, is an important de-
terminant of immigration. However, the original Roy model assumes that wages 
are the same across countries! In the simple skill-price model outlined above, 
inequality has two sources: inequality in skills and the level of the return to 
schooling b. The higher b is, the greater the earnings difference between high- 
and low-schooled persons in the country. However, differences in returns to 
schooling (and inequality) across countries will only have second-order effects 
compared with differences in skill prices in determining the amount and selectiv-
ity of migration.
Figure 4
Estimated (Purchasing-Power-Adjusted 1996) Earnings of High School and College 
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations from Table 2.1  Mark R. Rosenzweig
What is the effect of home-country relative “inequality” on the skill selectivity 
of immigration? In the one-skill model, higher inequality is due to higher “return” 
to schooling b. How does a rise in b in the sending country affect the differential 
gain of, say, high school and college graduates?
We can write the differential gain, high school and college graduates, as:
Gain for college graduate = eβUSSC(ωUS) – eβMSC(ωM)
Gain for high school graduate = eβUSSHS(ωUS ) – eβMSHS(ωM),
and compute the gains for b = 0.07 in the U.S. and Mexico. Then we can increase 
b to 0.10 in Mexico (more inequality) but keep average wages the same. The an-
nual migration gain for high school graduates increases by $269 (0.9 percent). 
The annual migration gain for college graduates decreases by $329 (0.8 percent) 
(Figure 5).
Migration is trivially less selective compared with changes in the skill-price 
differential; inequality is second-order.
Table 3
Determinants of Employment-Visa Immigration Rates by Receiving Country: 
Sample Immigrants per Country Population (x106)
Variable/country  Australia  United States
Country.skill.price.(NIS-P). –20.9. . –17.3
. (1.92). . (2.15)
GDP.per.adult-equivalent. 3.03.. .29
. (1.99). . (2.93)
Distance. –8.55.. –1.22
. (1.38). . (1.50)
Population. –.0475. –.00178
. (1.43). . (.58)
Constant. .75930.. 11659
. (1.41). . (2.26)
Number.of.countries. 132. 132
R2. .11. .07
NOTE: Absolute values of robust t statistics in parentheses.
SOURCES: For immigrant characteristics: New Immigrant Survey and Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to 
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Direct Effects of Out-Migration on Wages in Sending Countries
Short-Run Effects
General-Equilibrium Effect. This is basically supply and demand: If aggre-
gate skill quantity decreases, skill prices (wages) rise. This will increase sending-
country wages. Computable world general-equilibrium models show this.
Compositional Effect. If out-migrants are higher (lower) than average in 
skill compared with the home-country population, then average skill decreases 
(increases) in the home country due to out-migration.
Skilled  out-migration  thus  has  an  ambiguous  effect  on  sending  country 
wages: It raises the skill price but reduces average skill. Some analysts confuse 
these two effects. Borjas (2002), in discussing the effects of creating greater op-
portunities in the U.S. for skilled migrants, writes:
“Such a drain of human capital would further widen the income gap between 
the United States and the rest of the world, creating more incentives for migration 
to this country....” 
Table 4
Selectivity: Determinants of the Log Educational Attainment of Employment-Visa 
Immigrants in Australia and the United States (Combined)















NOTE: Absolute values of robust t statistics in parentheses.
SOURCES: For immigrant characteristics: New Immigrant Survey and Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to 
Australia 2, Wave 1 (Jasso and Rosenzweig 2005).10  Mark R. Rosenzweig
The skill price actually goes up in the sending country and the skill price gap, 
the incentive for migrating, narrows, so this is wrong.
Long-Run Effects
General-Equilibrium Effect. Changes in the skill price induced by the loss 
of skill raise the returns to skill investments—skills become scarcer and thus 
more valuable. Skills are not fixed but can respond to changes. Because the 
higher the out-migrants’ skill level the greater the rise in the skill price, more 
Table 5
Determinants of the Demand for (Log)U.S. Student Visas, 2003–04
Country characteristic  NIS-P skill price  OWW skill price
Log.of.country.skill.price. –.361. –.234. –.947. –.883
. (2.42). (1.32). (2.41). (2.23)
Log.of.GDP.per.adult-equivalent. .682. .692. 1.35. 1.35
. (2.95). (3.00). (2.95). (2.96)
Log.of.number.of.universities. .218. .768. .266. .435
. (1.90). (2.28). (2.26). (1.60)
Log.of.number.of.universities.x. –. –.0796. –. –.0328
...log.of.country.skill.price. . (1.86). .. (.67)
Any.ranked.universities.(top.200). .467. .630. .312. .381
. (1.72). (2.20). (1.10). (1.36)
Log.of.students.per.teacher,.primary.schools. –.377. –.418. –.240. –.246
. (1.17). (1.31). (.77). (.79)
Log.of.students.per.teacher,.secondary.schools. .783. .770. .659. .628
. (2.09). (2.03). (1.86). (1.75)
Log.of.population. .476. .492. .487. .491
. (3.57). (3.60). (3.47). (3.44)
Log.of.distance.to.nearest.U.S..city.of.entry.(miles). –.293. –.289. –.313. –.315
. (1.98). (1.92). (1.95). (1.94)
Constant. .–.801. –1.73. –4.04. –4.19
. (.30). (.66). (1.30). (1.34)
Number.of.countries. .124. 124. 124. . 124
R2. .733. .741. .729. .730
NOTE: Absolute values of robust t ratios in parentheses.
SOURCE: Rosenzweig (2006).The Circulation Migration of the Skilled and Economic Development  11
skilled out-migration will have a bigger effect on skill upgrading than less skilled 
out-migration. This long-run effect on incentives to invest in skills is ignored in 
the general-equilibrium models computing the consequences of migration. For 
evidence of responsiveness of school investments to change in returns in low-
income countries, see the development economics literature.
Migration Prospect Effect. Opening up the possibility of migration directly 
raises expected returns to skill investments. Assume that residents of a country 
face an exogenous probability p of being able to migrate to a higher skill-price 
country. Then residents respond to changes in the expected skill price:
(11)     (1 – p)ωj + pωk.
How large is the effect of increasing out-migration on the “return” to domes-
tic schooling? Consider the case of Mexico, using NIS–P skill prices (Figure 6). 
The expected annual wage difference, college vs. high school in Mexico, given 
the skill price, and with no migration is
(12)     E ( WC – WHS)M = eβ∆S(ωM) = $1,392,
Figure 5
PPP-Adjusted 1996 Estimated Annual Earnings in Mexico and the United States, 
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where β∆S = college – high school (four years).
The expected annual wage difference, college vs. high school, with an out-
migration probability p = .015 is
(13)     E (WC – WHS)M = eβ∆S[(1 – p)ωM + pωUS] = $1,623.
The expected annual wage difference, with out-migration probability p = 
.015 for college-educated only (only the college-educated can migrate), is
(14)     E (WC – WHS)M = eβSC[(1 – p)ωM + pωUS] – eβSHS(ωM) = $2,137.
The total annual gain in the college vs. high school wage differential (A – C) 
= $745 from taking into account the prospect of migration is small.
The Return of Skilled Immigrants. Returning immigrants may bring back 
to the home country increased skills and knowledge that could only be picked 
up abroad but are transferable to the home environment. And compared with 
low-skill migrants who work temporarily in low-skill jobs for a short period, high-
skill individuals working in dynamic sectors of the economy are more likely to 
Figure 6
Expected PPP-Adjusted 1996 Estimated Annual Earnings in Mexico, 
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contribute, upon return, to the institutional development of the home country.
What are the magnitudes of return migration by skilled immigrants who have 
acquired significant skills in the receiving country and who were not required to 
return home? We have two ways to find this for U.S. immigrants:
1.  Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) combined Immigration and Naturalization 
Service administrative records at entry for the FY1971 cohort of legal per-
manent immigrants with their subsequent naturalization and address re-
port records to estimate ten-year emigration rates: 30 percent, as high as 
50 percent in some countries.
2.  New Immigrant Survey: New 2003 (“permanent”) immigrants were asked, 
“Do you intend to spend the rest of your life in the U.S.?”
The Training of Students in Developed Countries and Their Return. 
Many individuals come to developed countries for schooling. Borjas offers this 
“criticism” of the U.S. student visa program (Borjas 2002):
“The program is best viewed as yet another redistribution program, taking 
wealth away from native workers and taxpayers and redistributing it to universi-
ties and foreigners [italics mine].”
To the extent that schooling is publicly subsidized in receiving countries and 
foreign students do not remain in the receiving country, there is an important 
subsidy from receiving-country taxpayers going to immigrant-sending countries.
How Do We Measure Brain Drain?
Now turn to two final questions. First, how large is the brain drain and return 
migration? Second, what are the principal determinants of return migration by 
foreign students and by “permanent” immigrants? I present two alternative defini-
tions (there are others).
The first is the proportion of highly educated persons born in a country liv-
ing outside the country. Recent estimates of this definition of brain drain (BD) are 
based on census-type data, supported by the World Bank (Docquier and Marfouk 
2006):
(15)     BDi = ΣFBij/(Si + ΣFBij),
where FBij = tertiary-educated persons age 25+ born in country i residing in des-
tination country j and Si =  tertiary-educated persons residing in origin-country 
i. For example:1  Mark R. Rosenzweig
82 percent of tertiary-educated Jamaicans reside outside Jamaica.
43 percent of tertiary-educated Ghanaians reside outside Ghana.
The second definition is the number or proportion of highly educated per-
sons who leave low-income countries for high-income countries, that is, the emi-
gration only of those educated in the sending countries (domestic brain drain):
(16)     DBDi = (ΣFBHij)/(Si + ΣFBHij – ΣSFBij),
  where FBHij = foreign-born residents educated in i living in j and SFBij = home-
country residents in i educated in j.
Although the first construct can be useful, the notion of skill out-migration is 
better captured by the second. The World Bank (BD) estimate thus overstates the 
outflow rate of skilled persons for a country for two reasons:
•  Many foreign born (FB) in destination countries received their schooling 
there, not in their home country. Thus the numerator is biased upward.
•  Some “stayers” (S) also received their schooling in the destination country 
and then returned to the home country. These educated-abroad native 
residents should be subtracted from the denominator.
How off are these estimates? We need to know:
•  Where  permanent  immigrants  in  receiving  countries  are  schooled—at 
home or in the host country?
•  Where stayers in sending countries are schooled—how many were for-
merly foreign students?
Where are the highly educated foreign-born schooled? Some emigrants left 
permanently as children and received all their higher schooling in the destina-
tion country. According to Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services data 
(FY2003), 20 percent of permanent resident aliens in the U.S. arrived before age 
18. For Jamaica, 38 percent arrived before age 20; for the Gambia, only 10 percent 
arrived before age 20.
Thus, BD overstates the migration of the already skilled, and the bias in the 
estimates varies by country. Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2006) recomputed 
their country-specific brain drain estimates to take into account those foreign-
born who arrived before age 22 (and could not possibly have completed their ter-
tiary schooling at home). On average, their corrected estimates of the brain drain 
are 68 percent of the ones published initially, with some as low as 51 percent of 
those reported in the earlier work.
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There is a caveat: Can the census data be used to correct the bias—remove 
those who arrived as children using information on date of arrival? For the U.S. 
(the major receiving country by far), date of entry is based on answers to the 
ambiguous question: “When did you first come to stay?” This contains a subjective 
element. They might answer when they received a permanent visa (not student 
visa) or when they first came at all (and some who have “permanent” visas, as we 
will see, never intend to stay).
The Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2006) estimates still do not take into ac-
count the training and experience received abroad by those residing in the home 
country. They neglect the reverse brain drain.
To examine foreign student return rates, we can construct a return rate for 
each country using the NIS data by dividing the number of permanent immigrants 
in 2003 (NIS) who had ever held a student visa (stayers) by the total stock of for-
eign students in 2003 (Student Exchange Visa Information System).
Estimates indicate about 6 percent of the stock convert to legal permanent 
resident status, consistent with about 80 percent of students not becoming per-
manent resident aliens in the United States and presumably returning home with 
their new skills (Rosenzweig 2007). We would like to know how skill prices in 
the home country affect the proportion who stay as legal permanent immigrants. 
In Rosenzweig (2007), I looked at the relationship between the return rate of 
students and skill prices and found that return rates of students were significantly 
higher to countries with higher skill prices.
Without tracking immigrants over time, it is not possible to obtain an accurate 
measure of how many highly skilled permanent immigrants return to their origin 
countries. As noted, the first round of the NIS asked the new immigrants whether 
they intended to stay in the United States for the rest of their lives. Figure 7 dis-
plays the proportions of immigrants, by visa type, who answered no and don’t 
know to this question. Among immigrants who never held a student visa (Figure 
7A) or who had not obtained employment visas (Figure 7C), 21 percent did not 
say they intended to stay, and 10 percent of those indicated they would not stay.
However, among the highly skilled “permanent” immigrants who obtained 
their tertiary schooling in the United States (Figure 7B), 38 percent did not an-
swer affirmatively—almost double the rate for those who did not receive their 
schooling in the U.S., with 16 percent saying no. Thus, the estimated return rates 
of students based on who immigrates among the students evidently understate 
the proportions who eventually return.
Among those who immigrated with an employment visa (Figure 7D), more 
than a third did not say they intended to stay in the United States for the rest 
of their lives, 50 percent more than immigrants outside this “skill” class. Thus it 
appears that more-skilled immigrants are more likely to return (or at least not 
stay). 1  Mark R. Rosenzweig
Figure 7
“Do You Intend to Stay in the United States the Rest of Your Life?”
SOURCE: New Immigrant Survey.
How do skill prices in the home country affect the proportions of immigrants 
who say they will not stay, from the NIS question? Table 6 reports linear regres-
sion estimates of the effects of home-country skill price on the probabilities of 
not answering affirmatively to the “stay” question of the NIS, for the immigrants 
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groups from higher skill price countries were more likely to not intend to stay in 
the United States. 
The estimates in Table 6 thus suggest that better-off countries on average at-
tract back more immigrants. Moreover, the skill price effect is stronger for those 
immigrants with more education. Higher-skill immigrants are more likely to re-
turn to the better-off countries.
How large are these effects? Figure 8 displays the percentage increase in the 
probability of not staying associated with a doubling of the home-country skill 
price by the schooling level of the immigrant, based on the estimates in Table 6. 
These indicate that while a doubling of the skill price increases the probability of 
not staying by 5 percent for those with less than a high school education, among 
high school graduates the increase is 25 percent. And for college graduates the 
same doubling of the skill price leads to a 47 percent increase in those not in-
tending to stay.
Another way of using the regression estimates is to compare the difference   
in the percentage of immigrants not intending to stay across college and high 
school graduates at different skill-price levels. Figure 9 shows these differences 
for three countries, based on their estimated skill prices. In the high-skill-price 
country, Great Britain, there is a 20 percentage point difference in the “return”   
of  college  versus  high  school  graduates.  This  compares  with  a  7  percentage   
Table 6
Determinants and Selectivity of the Proportion of New “Permanent” Immigrants 
Intending to Leave, 2003
Country characteristics/immigrant type  Former U.S. student                          All
Log.of.country.skill.price.(NIS.estimate). .0250. .0812. –.0355
. (3.26). (2.39). (2.49)
Log.of.country.skill.price.x.years.of.schooling. –. –. .00509
. . . (4.01)
Years.of.schooling. .0004. .0015. .00854
. (.25). (1.12). (3.09)
Number.of.countries. .59. 121. 121
Number.of.immigrants. 212. 3,879. 3,879
R2. .12. .03. .03
NOTE: Absolute values of robust t ratios in parentheses. Other variables included log of students per teacher, 
primary and secondary; age; age squared; gender; entry visa (employment principal, spouse of citizen); log of 
distance; any ranked universities; number of universities.
SOURCE: New Immigrant Survey.1  Mark R. Rosenzweig
point difference for Korea. However, in a low-skill-price country like Mexico,   
high school graduates are more likely to return compared with college graduates.
Conclusions
Some of the news about immigration’s impact on sending countries is posi-
tive. In fact, the greatest impact of the international flow of skilled immigrants 
on low-income countries may lie in the return of individuals experiencing good 
institutions—working  markets,  high-quality  educational  organizations—in  the 
destination country who then may have both the models and the means to effect 
institutional change in their home country. These will be returning students and 
skilled immigrants (for example, former President Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico).
In addition, the number of foreign-born skilled residing in developed coun-
tries substantially overstates the number of people educated in low-income coun-
tries who emigrated and especially overstates the net brain drain.
Further, a large number of people born in low-income countries receive their 
expensive, higher education in high-income countries, and the vast majority re-
turn to their home country despite the fact that the main motivation for acquiring 
education abroad appears to be wage improvements via migration.
Finally, a large fraction of “permanent” immigrants return to their home coun-
Figure 8
Percentage Increase in the Proportion of “Permanent” Immigrants Intending to Return 
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try. This rate is especially high among immigrants chosen on the basis of their 
skill.
On the negative side, the gaps between low-skill-price and high-skill-price 
countries, and thus the private gains from migration, are enormous, especially for 
the high-skilled.
And although high-skill out-migration is more prevalent in high-skill-price 
countries, both high- and low-skill immigrants leave low-skill-price countries in 
greater proportions.
Efforts to increase the number of domestic skilled persons through improving 
schools will be less effective in a low-skill-price country compared with a high-
skill-price country because of out-migration.
Last, return migration rates of the schooled-abroad and immigrants are sig-
nificantly lower and such returnees are significantly less skilled on average for 
low- than for high-skill-price countries.
The first-order issue is addressing why rewards to skills are low in low-
income countries, for which high out-migration and low return-migration are 
important symptoms. The training of people in high-income, high-quality institu-
tions may be the best assistance high-income countries provide.
Figure 9
Percentage Difference in the Proportion of “Permanent” Immigrants Intending to Return 
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